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The fundamental right to the freedom of the press has frequently been relied upon, 
not only by legal professionals, but also in discourses involving any public fi gure. 
Defenders of the freedom of the press tend to construe this right as a set of obligations 
for the government (regulation) to stay away from certain matters. I shall present 
arguments in the following parts to support another interpretation, under which 
freedom of the press is a more complex right covering various important values, in 
addition to the undisturbed operation of journalists, editors, and media outlets. In the 
following section, I discuss the philosophical foundations of this fundamental right, 
hence references to specifi c legal or constitutional provisions will be rare.
1. Discussion of the Fundamental Questions 
The fi rst advocates of freedom of speech, because of the nature of the social order at 
the time when the need for freedom was fi rst articulated, primarily preached the need 
for independence from the State. The struggle for freedom of the press and speech 
is a constant “concomitant phenomenon” of the drastic societal changes that can be 
viewed as prerequisites for today’s democratic order. The publicity created by the 
press, although sometimes revolutionarily rapid and therefore short-lived; sometimes 
slower and therefore more lasting, is the engine of these changes. However, the 
need for free speech and a free press never crystallised into a thesis as objectives 
in themselves: they were instruments necessary to reform society, realise a more 
just political system and, later, to involve the majority of the public in democratic 
decision-making.
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However, in freedom of speech, individual liberty also receives great emphasis. 
Each person is entitled to the right to fulfi l his individuality not only against the 
State but also against the community. Sometimes there is tension between the 
individualistic and community-based theories of freedom and, in practice, there is a 
need to strike a balance between individual rights and community interest.
After the two genocidal dictatorships of the 20th century, and as a result of them, 
the process, during which original, society-level objectives are sidelined and replaced 
by the recognition of individual rights above all, gained new momentum. According 
to certain views, the danger of the breach of these rights can only be expected from 
the State. However, other positions argue the necessity of the restriction of private 
sphere, which uses its “private censorship” more effectively than the State, because 
it overshadows freedom of speech, especially the societal function of the media 
resulting from the order of the objective of profi t production overriding everything. 
In the centre of the debate between the two opposing views lies the question of 
whether freedom of speech is a “multidimensional” right, in other words, whether, 
beyond its negative nature, according to which the State is obliged to respect the right 
and avoid interference with its practice, is there a positive nature, which obliges the 
State to perform certain proactive actions to further the opportunities for practicing 
the right? What is freedom of speech? What is its content?
Freedom of speech means that any person may express his or her opinions, may 
communicate facts, and may convey information originating from others freely. The 
actual contents of this right could be defi ned by analysing its limitations. However, 
such limitations – due to the outstanding importance of this right – may not be 
extensive; limitations must be justifi ed by the protection of other fundamental rights 
or material interests, and must be proportionate to the aim to be achieved. Due to 
the negative nature of the freedom of speech, no regulation may interfere with the 
exercise of this right beyond the approved limitations. According to the view of those 
exclusively advocating its negative nature, the role of the State ends after declaring 
the basic right and ensuring that it does not interfere itself with the practice or the 
right. Proponents of the negative nature believe that the State must retreat from 
the territory of this fundamental right, must recognise and respect it, but should 
neither participate actively in facilitating and enabling the practice of the right, nor 
in assisting in the resolution of disputes arising between citizens in the practice of 
the right.  
Obviously, the negative nature in itself is insuffi cient to defi ne the content of the 
right. To a certain extent, the State does have an obligation to make the practice of 
the right possible. The State must facilitate, for example, the organisation of public 
demonstrations, guarantee their safety and security, and ensure that demonstrators 
do not disrupt each other’s events. The State has to organise the regulation of the 
media so that, during elections, political organisations and candidates have access to 
the media; it has to run and fi nance public media, and has to provide fi nancial support 
to the arts and literature. 
For the fi rst time, Benjamin Constant differentiated between the liberty of 
“ancient” and “modern” times: the freedom of the Athenian citizen was only political 
in nature. He could freely participate in public affairs, could take part in decision-
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making, but his private sphere was strictly regulated. On the other hand, the modern, 
19th century citizen jealously protects his privacy, which is also guaranteed by the 
State. However, his political freedom is only apparent.2 
Differentiation between the “two principles” of freedom, which could be 
interpreted as the further development of Constant’s theory, appears for the fi rst time 
in the treatise of the English philosopher Isaiah Berlin.3 Berlin considers the space 
guaranteed for the individual without any outside intervention as negative liberty 
(freedom from something or someone) while he views positive liberty as being the 
right to make decisions, in other words, the individual’s self governance (freedom 
to something). Phrased in another way, negative freedom guarantees freedom in a 
formal, legal sense, while positive freedom provides actual possibility to act. Hence, 
it creates the effective “utilisation” of formal equality. A balance must be achieved 
between the two freedoms. “They take advantage of the principle of negative freedom 
in that they provide equal freedom to both the wolf and the sheep, and the State cannot 
intervene even if the wolf devours the sheep,”4 while positive freedom can only be 
guaranteed to the detriment of the negative freedom of others, so it cannot overstep 
the right measures. To apply all this to freedom of speech, if we only guarantee the 
negative nature of the right, the majority of people will not have an opportunity to 
participate in public debate; therefore, the guarantee of certain positive rights, such 
as balanced, objective information by the media, which in turn only can be achieved 
to the detriment of the negative freedom of news producers, because they have to 
provide news about events which they would not otherwise publish. However, the 
fairness of this intervention can be justifi ed. Partial sacrifi ce of positive freedom 
would take us back to Constant’s “ancient” liberty. 
Joel Feinberg emphasises the logical connection between negative and positive 
liberties. We cannot be free to something if fi rst we are not free from something: 
negative liberty is a precondition of positive liberty. The presence of the two, however, 
is together necessary for considering someone free, without any restrictions.5 
2. The Positive Nature of the Freedom of Speech
After reviewing the arising problems, we have to examine whether freedom of speech 
has a positive nature; is it a task for legal regulation to promote the actual exercise 
of the freedom of speech? If our answer is yes, another question we have to answer 
2   Benjamin CONSTANT: A régiek és a modernek szabadsága. [The Liberty of the Ancients and the 
Moderns] Budapest, Atlantisz, 1997.
3   Isaiah BERLIN: A szabadság két fogalma. [Two Concepts of Liberty] In: BERLIN: Négy esszé a 
szabadságról. [Four Essays on Liberty] Budapest, Európa Kiadó, 1990. 334–443.
4   DÉNES, Iván Zoltán: Beavatkozástól mentes cselekvés vagy uralomtól mentes emberi állapot? 
(A liberális és a republikánus szabadságfelfogás hasonlóságai és különbségei). [Action Free from 
Intervention or a Human State Free from Rule? (Similarities and Differences between Liberal and 
Republican Liberty Concepts)]  Jogelméleti Szemle, 2004/2.
5   Joel FEINBERG: Társadalomfi lozófi a. [Social Philosophy] Budapest, Osiris, 1999. 26–28.
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to is how exactly this duty appears in legal regulations and to what extent it prevails. 
It must be emphasised that “positive nature” means much more in this context than 
some kind of general obligation of the State to guarantee the most basic conditions 
for exercising the freedom of speech (e.g. public spaces must be made available – 
under certain conditions – for the purposes of public meetings and demonstrations).
The most important argument of the opponents of positive liberty is that, in 
recognising its positive nature, freedom of speech is violated because state intervention 
is possible. The guarantee of positive rights necessarily results in the violation of 
others’ negative rights. If the State provides the opportunity for an injured party to 
correct false statements about him in the media, the State restricts the freedom of the 
editors of that media product. We always have to be cautious about state intervention, 
because even if the intention is right, it possibly causes more damage than provides 
benefi ts.6 It is indisputable that the media must act honestly, but it is not desirable if 
the State forces honesty on the media because, if a state authority or court intervenes 
with the practice of freedom, the danger of abuse or simply a bad decision is always 
possible.  
The positive nature of freedom of speech, in other words providing a real opportunity 
to speak, is not necessarily the most important instrument for the expression of 
opinions. Although the arguments that explain the need for acknowledging the 
positive rights by stating that access to the media is restricted and its operational cost 
is immeasurable are powerful, they are however not suffi cient. Legally speaking, 
nobody is denied the right to establish a newspaper or television station, and 
restricted fi nancial resources are not the same as restricted legal rights. Accordingly, 
the lack of positive rights does not mean the denial of freedom of speech; however, 
its acknowledgement would not guarantee its proper practice. The effective practice 
of freedom of speech requires access but also a suitable literacy, education, and 
fi nancial situation, not to mention the role of personal features (good looks, correct 
speech, etc.). If we accepted that a general, positive right exists within the concept 
of freedom of speech, we could just as rightfully demand the improvement of at least 
the previously mentioned external conditions (for example, the education received).7 
According to one of the main arguments for the acknowledgement of positive 
rights, democratic decision-making and public debate would suffer if the law 
would not provide an opportunity to practice freedom of speech effectively. This is 
important, not from the speaker’s but from the listeners’, the audience’s perspective, 
who must be familiar with all relevant information to attain a real decision-making 
position. 
If we primarily judge the value of speech based on its role in democracy, the 
pressing argument for the restriction of the media becomes dominant. Namely, the 
media are the only truly effective instrument that can reveal the various viewpoints 
to the community. This characteristic justifi es their regulation and the restriction of 
6   Frederick SCHAUER: Freedom of speech: a philosophical enquiry. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1982. 128. 
7   Ibid. 126. 
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content, to a certain extent, of the media. However, this argument is not suffi cient 
to make the positive nature of the freedom of the press acceptable. As Alexander 
Meiklejohn stated, the important thing is not that everybody is allowed to speak 
but that everything of importance shall be said.8 The fulfi lment of the democratic 
duties of the media, which is achieved through various institutions and instruments, 
provides the opportunity of access not to individuals but to individual standpoints 
(and, of course, indirectly their representatives, too). Public service obligations, 
mandatory news broadcasts, balance, impartiality, etc., provide, through institutional 
means, the possibility of public debate, and only on very limited occasions does the 
right to access by concrete individuals exist; for example, when correcting a press 
statement or providing mandatory access regarding political broadcasting during 
election campaigns. 
According to the other main argument, providing the opportunity to speak 
is important because this is the only means of creating equality among citizens. 
According to Kenneth Karst, the basic principle of the First Amendment of the 
Constitution of the USA is equality, which to a certain extent is a barrier to others’ 
freedom.9 Participation in forming public opinion is everybody’s equal and morally 
based right. It cannot be the privilege only of the wealthy. That is why at least some 
opportunity has to be provided for everybody to comment on a given debate and the 
speakers’ positive right must be acknowledged. Simultaneously with this, others’ 
obligation to provide instruments and opportunities to facilitate the effective practice 
of freedom of speech must be recognised, too.  However, obviously, this should not 
mean that everybody can appear on television, but it does mean, for example, that 
everybody has the right to protest in public or distributing fl yers on the street, all this 
under state protection. Equal access cannot be guaranteed in the practice of freedom 
of speech, but the regulation of the media and the opportunity to utilise instruments, 
besides the media, for the expression of opinion, may provide a balance. Equality 
must be interpreted perhaps from the perspective of a given opinion and not that of 
individuals.10   
According to Michel Rosenfeld, the lack of positive freedom of speech imperils 
democracy, because it can be interpreted as „a concentration of power and support of 
monopolist tendencies.”11 The average citizen, observing his and others’ helplessness, 
easily acquiesces to public affairs being decided “over his head,” without his opinion 
being sought.
8   Alexander MEIKLEJOHN: Political freedom – the constitutional powers of the people. New York, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965. 26.
9   Kenneth L. KARST: Equality as a central principle in the First Amendment. University of Chicago Law 
Review, 1975. 20.
10  Michel ROSENFELD: Free speech, equality and minority access to the media in the United States. 
In: András SAJÓ – Monroe E. PRICE (szerk.): Rights of access to the media. Boston, Kluwer Law 
International, 1996. 72–74. 
11  Michel ROSENFELD: Az emberi jogok és az alkotmány az Egyesült Államokban. [Human Rights and 
the Constitution in the United States] Világosság, 1990/8–9. 596. 
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Those advocating exclusively for the negative nature of the right forget or make 
the wrong judgment about the danger of private restrictions of freedom of speech. 
Jerome Barron calls the belief, which assumes that the free market for speech 
and the withdrawal of the State will create the necessary balance, the “romantic 
interpretation” of freedom of speech.12 The fact that the speech will not be “audible” 
unless we invest huge amounts of money and the nearly exclusive monopoly of the 
media in infl uencing public opinion has altered the picture previously formed about 
freedom of speech. Today, if we intend to correct the inequalities of the private 
sphere (the free market of speech), we must turn for help to the once “feared enemy” 
of free speech, the State.13 
It may be concluded from the comparison of the confl icting views that the positive 
nature of freedom of speech may be implemented primarily in a special situation – 
meaning the defi nition of the contents of the freedom of the press – only. Generally 
(meaning speeches outside of the media), the differences between the various means 
of exercising rights may be eliminated by indirect means (e.g. by state aid in the fi elds 
of culture, by regulating election campaign fi nances, etc.) only.
3. The Meaning of Freedom of the Press
On the basis of the above considerations, freedom of speech is not a one-dimensional 
right. It achieves its full potential, applying Isaiah Berlin’s differentiation, through 
the simultaneous prevalence of its positive and negative natures. Freedom of 
speech, however, is not the same as freedom of the press. According to the narrow 
interpretation of the freedom of the press, the various media (newspapers, online 
forums, television channels, radio stations, etc.) and the journalists and reporters of 
such media may elaborate their opinions on the basis of this right. By doing so, they 
essentially exercise the right of free speech within an institution, which is otherwise 
– in addition to the general right to free speech – subject to numerous other rules. The 
liberty right bestowed on the media is actually not a right for the individual (e.g. for 
journalists) but for the institution, even though the direct benefi ciary of freedom of 
the press is typically the journalist, or the editor.
We have good reasons to guarantee freedom of the press, of which the most 
important is the interest in ensuring the proper function of democratic societal order. 
However, the content and meaning of freedom of the press is not usually discussed 
with proper weight in treatises and textbooks on the boundaries of freedom of 
speech, neither in Hungary nor, for example, in the United States.14 It is as if the 
arising problems could only be narrowed to the realm of expressibility (the direct 
12  Jerome A. BARRON: Access to the press – A new First Amendment right. Harvard Law Review, 1967. 
1642–43. 
13  Owen M. FISS: Free speech and social structure. Iowa Law Review, July 1986. 1405. o. and FISS: The 
irony of free speech. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1996.
14  Marvin AMMORI: Another worthy tradition: how the free speech curriculum ignores electronic media 
and distorts free speech doctrine. Missouri Law Review, 2005. 59.
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limitations of the right), although there are many more questions to ask and answer 
concerning freedom of the media. The examination of the content of freedom of the 
press inevitably poses structural-institutional questions as well as other dilemmas 
regarding, for example, the restriction of free competition, protection of national 
culture, and the proper representation of public interest in general.  
The differentiation between the positive and negative natures is a guiding 
principle within the concept of freedom of the press, too, and it can be interpreted 
with the same content as freedom of speech. The starting point is also freedom from 
something (negative), in other words, prohibition of intervention. However, in this 
case, we must pay attention to the restriction of the right by the private sphere, too. 
The freedom to something (positive), in turn, with regard to the freedom of the press 
generally does not provide rights to access that can be demanded by individuals. 
However, for the sake of broader access, the right may provide, to a certain extent, 
exceptions from the prohibition of intervention exactly for the sake of full assurance 
of the right to liberty.
Every analysis can only interpret the right of freedom of the press in the light of the 
rapid, day-by-day progress and transformation of the media. However, globalisation, 
convergence, and monopolisation, which are almost inextricably interlaced with 
each other, have not fully eliminated, in the process of media development, any 
room for state legislation and legal enforcement. Technological developments 
have a great ability to make us forget under their cover about the validation of the 
regulatory principles, which more or less independent from the characteristics of the 
transmitting medium, and their original rationale and meaning. It has to be stated 
again and again: in the regulation of the media, there are certain constant principles 
and values, the application and enforcement of which are of fundamental importance 
for the citizens of democratic and culturally unique states.      
Simply stated, the sharp dividing line is between the proponents of the free market 
and State intervention, but numerous variations of these ideas exist in both groups. 
A great majority of the proponents of the free market trust in the market, not because 
they view the media as any other commodity for sale (such as, for example, nail 
polish), but because they are wary of any role the State might play in regulating the 
operation of the media. Possibly they completely understand the imperfections of 
the market and the adverse effects the logic of the market has on the media, but they 
are ready to pay even this price to keep the State away. Others believe, with blind 
faith in the market but perhaps with a great amount of cynicism, that the market 
is omnipotent: with rules created by and for itself, the market ensures the best 
possible and most effective functioning of the media, satisfying private and public 
interests simultaneously. Quoting Clinton Rossiter, this is nothing else but “the great 
train robbery of [American] intellectual history”15: today’s devoted supporters of 
laissez faire, reinterpreting but tirelessly using the arguments of 19th century early 
liberalism, want to preserve, in the security of unchanged guarantees against the 
15  Clinton ROSSITER: Conservatism in America. New York, Vintage Books, 1962 (2nd ed.) 128.
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State, its defi ned fundamental values (liberty, individualism, opportunity, progress, 
etc.,) in the interest of protecting the already much stronger private sphere and large 
international corporations which overcome state interests with effortless ease. The 
operation of the media, which simultaneously demands several basic human rights 
originally belonging in the realm of private autonomy (freedom of the press, right to 
property, freedom to conduct a business), becomes regulated to protect the original 
meaning of liberty. Prevention of media monopolies, positive and negative content 
regulations, and actions attempting to protect culture, although they undoubtedly 
restrict the media’s room to manoeuvre, in reality do not limit liberty: on the contrary, 
they serve to mend the concept of liberty which has possibly been deformed by the 
private sphere. The positions, which do not enthusiastically welcome but accept out 
of necessity State intervention as the only possible solution, view the media as a 
fundamental institution of national existence. It is because the media can be “used” 
for much more than any other service offered on the market. We could respect the 
press even as the network providing the primary forum for facilitating the cohesion of 
society, taking a key role in conducting the debates of the community, and promoting 
universal and national culture.         
The market and the State, however, are forced to exist next to each other and 
tolerate one another. The fi rst provisions (section 3, paragraph 1) of the British media 
law, the Communications Act 2003, which defi nes the simultaneous furthering of the 
interests of citizens and consumers as a general duty of the communications authority, 
are perfect refl ections of this reluctant duality. Needless to say, the two interests are 
often in confl ict. However, the media must respect both. The consumer is interested 
in technological improvement, low prices, and a wide selection of entertaining shows, 
while the citizen is interested in proper access to information, satisfaction of their 
cultural needs, and the opportunity to participate in public debates. Of course, the 
description of these two different approaches is signifi cantly simplifi ed, because in 
reality these needs, although in different proportions, are combined in the members of 
the media audience, as most of them are consumers and proud citizens at the same time. 
With some cynicism, the new prototype of the ideal human being, which started 
to develop in the second half of the 20th century and has achieved its full form by 
today, is homo consumer. Resulting from the unchallengeable logic of the economic 
system chosen by the states of western civilization, the ideal of the modern era is 
the increasingly intensive consumption of material goods. The appearance and 
overwhelming numerical superiority of homo consumer, it seems, ended the 
posthumous competition of George Orwell and Aldous Huxley.16 The two English 
clairvoyants of the fi rst half of the 20th century described two perfectly contradictory 
dystopias. Orwell‘s 1984, which was still banned on this side of the Iron Curtain in 
the 80s of the last century, is the shocking illustration of totalitarian regimes, where 
tyrannical authority prevails using dictatorial measures. Huxley’s Brave New World, 
16  George ORWELL: 1984. Budapest, Európa Kiadó, 1989.; Aldous HUXLEY: Szép új világ. [Brave New 
World] Budapest: Kozmosz Könyvek, 1982.
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on the other hand, erects a model more relevant at least in this part of the world 
because, in the new world, the oppressive dictatorship does not work. Maintenance 
of authority is achieved by the satisfaction of the carefully regulated individual needs 
of the subjects. Unfortunately, we cannot assert that some of the elements of the 
dark future described in the novel could not be paralleled with events of the more 
than seven decades that have passed since its publication. Some authors go as far as 
identifying the effects of modern media on individuals with the effects of the mood 
enhancing drug, soma.17 Although, if there is some rhetorical overstatement, Huxley 
himself admitted his prophetic abilities in a later essay, in which he describes his 
worries concerning the effect mechanisms of modern media.18     
The greatest mistake of the theory preferring the market is the way it approaches 
the question of individualism. These views respect individual autonomy (both in 
relation to the freedom to run a business and freedom of the press), as a primary 
value, which position, of course, is acceptable. However, autonomy can be interpreted 
from two opposite directions, from the perspective of the media and of its audience. 
The supporters of the market argue that the lack of state restrictions helps both to the 
same extent: the media are not bound by an outside authority, and the audience can 
chose from an unrestricted supply. This is the fi rst fl aw in the argument, as modern 
mass media, which in general aim at the simplest and quickest profi t-making, without 
hesitation throwing aside its fulfi lment of the duties indispensable to the functioning 
of democracy, subordinates its broadcast time primarily to the entertainment of the 
largest possible masses, in the holy name of individualism, thus contributing to the 
development of the no-personality mass human being. Ortega y Gasset has painted a 
long time ago in his classic essay, The Revolt of the Masses, the process of the rise to 
power of the mass human being (who can be identifi ed without further ado with our 
homo consumer above). 19 
Of course the dead end of unrestricted individualism was recognised long 
before Ortega. Free market capitalism produced serious societal injustices early 
on. First, since the beginning of the 20th century, classical private law began to go 
through signifi cant transformations. This development is called the publicization or 
constitutionalisation of private law20 and it resulted in the loosening of fundamental 
private law principles and structures for the sake of the more effective protection of 
the living conditions of the personality and the individual. What seemed before the 
only real token for the autonomy of the personality, i.e., the enhanced protection of 
private property and the private sphere, because of the cruel logic of the market and 
only a little over a century after the codifi cation of these rights began, questioned 
17  Ronald K. L. COLLINS – David M. SKOVER: The First Amendment in an age of paratroopers. Texas Law 
Review, May 1990. 1084.
18  Aldous HUXLEY: Visszatérés a szép új világhoz. [Brave New World Revisited] Budapest, Dee-Sign, 
2000.
19  Ortega Y. GASSET: A tömegek lázadása. [The Revolt of the Masses] Budapest, Nagyvilág, 2003.
20  LÁBADY, Tamás: A magyar magánjog (polgári jog) általános része. [The General Part of Hungarian 
Private Law (Civil Law)] Pécs – Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 1997. 22–27. 
András KOLTAY146
the basic conditions for the existence of the weaker individual who did not have any 
property. To prevent vulnerability, human rights, especially human dignity of the 
individual, who was defi ned as a property owner before, came to the forefront.21 This 
process received another push after World War II. However, it soon became apparent 
that limitless application of human rights (including freedom of the press) could be 
also used to take advantage of the status of the weaker. Hence, the freedom of the 
few must be controlled for the sake of the freedom of the masses. Many recognised 
this, and came to the only possible conclusion that steered the future development of 
private and human rights from individualism to some sort of a community principle-
based theory. At the beginning of the 20th century, the British legal scholar Albert 
Dicey treated this transformation as evident, reporting in his book about the change 
of principles affecting the thinking of British public opinion. According to his 
assertions, from the beginning of the 19th century, a sort of collectivist view22, which, 
of course, also infl uenced the thinking concerning the role of the press, started to 
replace Bentham’s individualism. This notion is very signifi cant in the “cradle” of 
individualism, which, according to certain authors, was already market-oriented in 
the 13th century, and was built for centuries on the sanctity of private property and the 
strength of the individual23, in the spirit of Puritan traditions, measuring the value of 
a person according to his commercial success.
During the historical development, of course, the negative nature of the freedom 
of the press was emphasised, which right then was identifi ed with the prohibition 
of censorship. This coincides with the thinking that the ban of “prior scrutiny” will 
lead to the total freedom of the press. This view required re-evaluation after the 
adoption of the fi rst laws eliminating censorship, because external interference with 
the freedom of the press has a wide range of possibilities besides the limitation of 
publication. To prevent providing information for the community from becoming the 
monopoly of a few, the law limits the ownership right of broadcasters and newspapers 
and the possibility of cross ownership, defi ning a limit over which the same owner 
cannot obtain further rights. The maintenance of state funding of public service 
media further limits free competition. Naturally, these rules also indirectly affect the 
content channelled through by the media.
However, the various programming structure requirements imposed on radio and 
television media service providers have direct effects on the content of the media. 
Part of these set negative requirements (advertisement limitations, protection of 
minors, limitation of erotic content), others demand explicitly positive, proactive 
behaviour from the producers of broadcasts (balanced news reporting, broadcasting 
of public service programming, etc.). 
21  On this process cf. SÓLYOM, László: A személyiségi jogok elmélete. [The Theory of Personal Rights] 
Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1983.
22  Albert Venn DICEY: Lectures on the relation between law and public opinion in England during the 
Nineteenth Century. London, MacMillan, 1919.
23  Alan MACFARLANE: Az angol individualizmus eredete. [The Origins of English Individualism] 
Budapest, Századvég – Hajnal István Kör, 1993.
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Interference with the freedom of the media can originate not only from outside but 
also from inside. This phenomenon stems from the business nature of the media. It 
is a fundamental truth that the media, which are expensive ventures, are sponsored 
not by the readers but the advertisers. It can be logically inferred that, approaching 
from the business nature of the enterprise, the “products” offered for sale are not 
the news articles and programmes produced by the media. If that were the case, the 
media, at least in their current form and extent, would not be capable of supporting 
themselves. In reality, the “products” offered are the viewers, listeners, and readers, 
in that the larger their numbers, the higher the advertising fees are in exchange. That 
is why a popular product, newspaper, and programme have to be offered as a bait 
to attract more and more customers and turn them into the consumers of the media, 
and with that, of the commercials. The advertisers, who, because of the high prices 
in the case of the most important media, can only be really large companies, become 
the number one controllers of the whole process, even if their effect remains indirect. 
And in the market, where a lot of money is risked, rock hard rules prevail: advertisers 
prefer to see their commercials in a media environment deemed appropriate, possibly 
in the neighbourhood of programmes that are popular, controversy free, entertaining, 
radiate a peaceful and quiet atmosphere, or, without any real stake, generate 
excitement and suspense. Talk shows, television series, game shows, magazine 
programmes, and action movies are perfect for this goal. Programmes dissecting real 
societal problems, fact fi nding, more sophisticated cultural programmes, or other 
programmes that interest only a smaller portion of social groups with signifi cant 
purchasing power are less suitable for this kind of advertising.24 The result is nearly 
total homogeneity of the selection of competing streams of programming, in which 
almost no signifi cant differences can be detected (because of the risk of losing 
consumers). Free competition, making possible the operation of many competing 
media, increases only the quantity but not the selection.    
The competition for consumers is increasingly intensifying, and the converging 
media more and more interweave with everyday life, while community debate and 
social “discourse“ slowly disappear.25 Advertisers categorise their potential customers 
(the target group) based on their fi nancial status (purchasing power), persuadability, 
and other such characteristics that hardly fi t in the democratic principle of “one 
man – one vote.”26 Internal “private censorship” that subordinates everything to the 
maximisation of profi ts, which can stem from the personal interests or even political 
convictions of the owners or employees of the media, however, is not the same as 
external censorship. In the case of the former, we cannot talk about tyranny, or 
even justifi able external intervention closely regulated with legislative guarantees. 
24  Robert W. MCCHESNEY – Ben SCOTT (eds.): Our unfree press – 100 years of radical media criticism. 
New York, New Press, 2004. 119–176.; EDWIN C. BAKER: Advertising and a democratic press. 
Princeton University Press, 1994.
25  Ronald K. L. COLLINS – David M. SKOVER: The death of discourse. Carolina Academic Publishers, 
2005.
26  FISS, supra note 12., 54.
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Anyway, censorship in constitutional states has already long disappeared. However, 
its new form, private censorship, which is indirectly imposed by interest groups 
commissioning the advertisements, achieves similar results as its once existing 
“step-brother”, realised exclusively through external forces: it makes diffi cult and 
even impossible for of the media to perform their public service obligations.
The positive nature of freedom of the press is inseparably interwoven with 
the concept of social publicity. Although the theory is primarily connected to 
the name of Jürgen Habermas27 and, during the decades since its publication 
(1962), representatives of various social sciences dissected its details in numerous 
occasions, from our perspective its main principles can be accepted without any 
major arguments. The central nucleus of the train of thought concentrates around the 
conceptual construction of “public opinion,” which has existed in practice since the 
18th century.28 According to the theory, the elements of “publicity” (from coffee houses 
to newspapers) jointly contributed to the development of public thinking and critical 
outlook, and the slow and gradual start of the process of democratisation. Publicity 
ensured access to information, and, with time, it grew so signifi cant that it became 
capable of restricting the State. An important element of the concept is the provision 
of a wide range of opportunities to access, with the help of a near equal opportunity 
of participation ensured by low costs of entry.29 According to Habermas, the 20th 
century development of mass media, though in principle contained the possibility of 
the broadening of publicity with great magnitude as compared with the earlier state 
of affairs, in practice destroyed the earlier, well-functioning model of public sphere. 
The mass media monopolised the forums of public opinion and, among the topics of 
the media, defi ned and dictated by logic of the market, the proper representation of 
mutual and joint interests is no longer a defi ning factor. This fi nal conclusion of the 
book can be accepted regardless of the truth of Habermas’ other theses. 
The category of public opinion is important for us, because the only acceptable 
social structure, democracy, can only work exclusively through public opinion. If 
the affairs of the “public” are not debated in the various institutions of publicity, if 
citizens do not connect with each other at various forums, if these forums do not 
provide the minimal cohesion necessary between the members of society, then, 
although it is possible that the laws are promulgated by parliament based on public 
representation, the community no longer exists in a democratic order.
Pericles’ famous Funeral Oration30 directly stigmatises men indifferent to public 
life. Reference to ancient Athens is appropriate at this point. It is because the wide 
27  Jürgen HABERMAS: A társadalmi nyilvánosság szerkezetváltozása. [The Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere] Budapest, Osiris, 1999 (3rd ed.).
28  Asa BRIGGS – Peter BURKE: A média társadalomtörténete – Gutenbergtől az internetig. [A Social 
History of the Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet]  Budapest, Napvilág, 2004. 74.
29  Monroe E. PRICE: A televízió, a nyilvános szféra és a nemzeti identitás. [Television, the Public Sphere 
and National Identity] Budapest: Magvető, 1998. 54. 
30  THUCYDIDES: A peloponnészoszi háború. [History of the Peloponnesian War] Budapest, Osiris, 1999. 
134–43. 
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spread of the media and the increase of its effects and infl uence generated the naïve 
belief, according to which the direct exercise of power, or at least something similar 
to it, of the Greek polises may be recreated with the instruments of modern media. 
The media would provide an opportunity to conduct citizens’ debates, through the 
naturally necessary mechanisms of representations, because everybody cannot 
speak, and some inevitably have to represent others.31 Although not the same as the 
Athenian agora, the media is such a public forum that is the only effective venue and 
functioning means of the expression of various viewpoints.32 Quoting the forceful 
expression of Owen Fiss, this would be the media’s “democratic mission.”33  
The most authoritative (and consequently most attacked) American devotee 
besides Owen Fiss of necessary state intervention in the fi eld of freedom of the press 
is Chicago professor Cass Sunstein. His work, summarising the modern age problems 
of freedom of speech, is a legal complaint written against the free marketplace of 
ideas.34 In his book, Sunstein unequivocally demands a second New Deal because, 
according to his discoveries, modern media not only fail to extend a helping hand to 
it, but also makes the functioning of democracy impossible. The main conclusions 
of the book focusing on the United States should be taken into account in Europe, 
too. The primary concerns weighing heavily on the author’s mind are not novelties. 
With the full expansion of commercial media, the hope of training active citizens 
to gain decisive roles in participatory democracies proportionately decreases. 
According to the professor, the United States should give up the stubborn resistance 
that prevents state intervention, because strictly keeping the distance only makes the 
status quo, the increasingly growing media empire, even more powerful. In certain 
instances, buttressed by strict guarantees, the State is indeed capable of promoting 
liberty. To borrow the metaphor of the market, representative democracy is based 
on representation by citizens selected by, and from among, themselves from time to 
time (in Hungary every four years) to conduct ongoing business and make decisions. 
During the elections taking place every four years, citizens naturally generally 
have less information compared to those elected. The political elite always will be 
signifi cantly more informed than other members of society. The media, should, to 
the best of its abilities, balance this information defi ciency, as the decision of the 
citizens is irrevocable and irreversible. However, the current system is unsuitable 
for publishing the available views and information, because the discussion of public 
affairs is not in the interest of the majority of the media; what is more, it would be 
explicitly burdensome.       
Therefore, based on the foregoing, ideas – in a philosophical sense – are entitled 
to access, but such a conclusion is quite hard to be refl ected in legal regulations. 
However, regulation has found the means that may – even if not eliminate, but 
31  John KEANE: Média és demokrácia. [Media and Democracy] Budapest, Helikon, 1999. 155., 38–39. 
32  Charles W. LOGAN: Getting beyond scarcity: a new paradigm for assessing the constitutionality of 
broadcast regulation. California Law Review, December 1997.
33  FISS, supra note 12., 50.
34  Cass R. SUNSTEIN: Democracy and the problem of free speech. New York, Free Press, 1995 (2nd ed.).
András KOLTAY150
at least – reduce the differences between the chances of conveying certain ideas 
to the public. As such, in legal terms, the entirety of the audience of the media is 
entitled (relying on concrete regulatory provisions) to demand proper and balanced 
information and access to differing ideas. Of course, not even lawyers can think 
that this form of direct access, the composition of the list of ideas to be published, 
and balance portioned on a pharmacy scales, is free from all serious diffi culties. 
On the contrary, the task is very sensitive and requires able journalists and editors. 
Obviously, not every idea deserves publicity. The defi nition of a rational framework 
is indispensable. The perspective for differentiation could be, for example, the 
societal proportion of citizens representing the given viewpoint, and the respect for 
legal regulations and moral principles. While the rules defi ning the limitations (e.g. 
hate speech, personal rights, protection of children) to the freedom of speech and 
the freedom of the press are relevant to such decisions, they in themselves do not 
determine all the relevant aspects of the necessary selection of ideas; the positive 
nature may not be fully implemented without the appropriate attitude on the side of 
journalists, editors, and media owners.
However, the rule of balanced information – widely applied in Europe – is just one 
of the rules resulting in access. Among other, the followings should be mentioned 
as well: the right to respond (right to correction), the operation of the public service 
media system – one of the main tasks of which is to correct the imperfect operation 
of the market of ideas –, the restriction of ownership concentration on the media 
market, or the must carry obligations of broadcasters. These rules may be called 
comprehensively the rules facilitating media pluralism and so recognition of the 
positive nature of press freedom fundamentally serves the purposes of media 
pluralism.
Nobody demands total impartiality from the media. A wide space is available for 
biased publications and programmes. This, however, has to be separated from the task 
of supplying information. Although the proposal is tendentiously naïve, in reality, 
nothing else would be necessary but that the media respect the ethical rules created 
for themselves. Of course, our age does not favour codes of ethics, as other interests 
overrule them. Equality enforced by legal means can never be full and cannot be 
desirable either, because viewpoints represented by more people perhaps deserves 
more exposure. The goal to be set is the pluralism of opinions and not equality.35  
Many arguments can be brought up against the acknowledgement of the positive 
nature of freedom of the press. According to one of the groups of arguments, all kinds 
of state interventions rest on inherently false foundations, because if we are serious 
about democracy, a fundamental right of such importance and, at the same time, of 
symbolic value cannot be limited by the decision of a small circle of people (be it even 
parliament). Calling a spade a spade, it is more desirable that the audience decides 
what it wants from the media than, regarding its numbers, a proportionately narrow 
social stratum. The preferences of the audience can be measured relatively precisely. 
35  Giovanni SARTORI: Demokrácia. [Democracy] Budapest, Osiris, 1999. 60–61.
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The audience will signal in a noticeable manner if it wants more programmes of 
political debate or perhaps broader information. If the public wants entertainment, its 
decision must be accepted instead of despising it, as Pericles did, for its indifference to 
public affairs. Anyway, public interest in relation to the media has not been precisely 
defi ned36, and it is not more than an oft referenced but never defi ned rhetorical catch. 
It is only a presumption that the free fl ow of information, debate of public affairs, and 
pluralism of the media serve the public interest.
As Rupert Murdoch, the powerful owner of News Corporation, says, let freedom 
and choice replace regulation and scarcity.37 The media is just a commodity, like 
anything else38, as for example, according to Mark Fowler, “[t]he television is just 
another appliance – it’s a toaster with pictures,” and if a toaster does not make a 
perfect toast, nobody will buy it. Based on this analogy, the content of the media can 
only be infl uenced by the direction of market competition. 
Without a doubt, the market has certain advantages that the State cannot provide 
with its own instruments. Competition can eliminate the incompetent, increase 
quality, and promote development. It makes performance measurable. Sometimes the 
market is forced to make concessions to satisfy minority needs, too. The argument 
supporting freedom of the market has a very bogus point. It looks at the fi gures, 
examines what the majority selects from the available choices, and concludes that 
the audience demands exactly what the media, through the selected programme, 
presently provides. In its simplicity, this seemingly effective argument loses its edge 
if we recognise that, in the market fi lled by the modern mass media, the audience 
does not have a real opportunity to choose. The audience can only choose from 
among the products that are offered. They perhaps do not even know what other 
possible choices and programmes the media could offer besides the ones they already 
know. The media by itself is not capable of providing colourful programming, at 
least not in a reachable manner for the masses. The large majority of society 
receives information primarily from television, in Hungary and Europe namely from 
terrestrial broadcasting channels, of which so far altogether three are available in 
Hungary. The other weakness of the argument is that it pretends as if the media 
merely catered to the needs of the audience, although, it just as much shapes, or, with 
a stronger expression, dictates public taste.    
Others argue against the acknowledgement of the positive nature with the 
fetishization of the market but claim that everything is better than state intervention. 
According to this view, the State must retreat to the smallest possible area and should 
only undertake the most important tasks (law enforcement, guarantee of substantive 
36  Everette E. DENNIS,: The press and the public interest: a defi nitional dilemma. In: E. E. DENNIS – A. H. 
ISMACH – D. M. GILLMOR (eds.): Enduring issues in mass communication. St. Paul, Minnesota, West 
Publishing, 1978.
37  KEANE, supra note 33., 45. 
38  Daniel L. BRENNER – Mark S. FOWLER: A marketplace approach to broadcast regulation. Texas Law 
Review, 1981.
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rights, etc.).39 They do not deny the appropriateness of the intentions of people 
urging regulation, as the proponents of the “night watch state” also would like it if 
the media fulfi lled its information distribution function respecting ethical norms, 
but the enforcement of this should not be entrusted to the State, because that would 
necessarily distort the execution of the originally noble intention.40 
According to this, the State is a constant source of danger to individual liberty, and 
its limitation is a basic requirement of democratic order. Well, the proponents of state 
intervention argue for the State to play a role, not because of some sort of totalitarian 
devotion but because they sensed the restricting effect of the private sphere. Today 
the State has a rather narrow margin for action; a series of constitutional safeguards 
guarantee the rights of the individual. However, no similar guarantees would be 
available against the media operating in the private sphere. The media’s obligatory 
function stands in the centre. If somebody disrupts that function, it is essential to 
stand up against it. 
Robert Post argues that the views demanding accountability from the media for 
democratic principles are self-contradictory. That is to say, democracy, at least if 
we try to fi ll it with actual content, assumes free, autonomous, and independently 
thinking and decision-making individuals. Hence, democracy and individualism 
do not contradict each other (as we have already asserted it in connection with the 
theories justifying freedom of speech). If, in the name of democracy, we limit the 
individual’s (media owner and journalist) margin for action and, simultaneously 
with this, in a paternalistic manner facilitate that the “ideal democrat” (as we 
imagined), appropriately receives information, we contradict the principles of this 
very democrat, because this way we limit the strengthening of individual autonomy.41 
Accepting its content of truth, the force of the argument is signifi cantly weakened by 
the fact that, in practice, the liberty of mass media can only create the false illusion 
of individualism. Lack of information, our “democrat,” raised with the assistance of 
the media, under the spell of endless entertainment, is in reality incapable of making 
autonomous decisions. The market by itself does not advance the perfection of his 
personality.
It has to be asserted as a note of general validity that the indirect existence of 
access to less popular channels accessible only to limited circles is not suffi cient 
for “ticking off” the democratic duties of the media. We have to take reality into 
account. Adequate catering to public interest must be assured through forums that 
are accessible (both in a technological and a fi nancial sense) to the majority of society, 
where in practice “majority” ought to mean the entirety of society. Currently, this 
forum primarily means national television. If the majority receives information from 
there, the appropriate fl ow of information must be provided through that channel.  
39  Robert NOZICK: Anarchy, state and utopia. New York, Basic, 1974.
40  SCHAUER, supra note 5., 128.
41  POST, Robert C.: Meiklejohn’s mistake: individual autonomy and the reform of public discourse. 
University of Colorado Law Review, Fall 1993. 1109. and POST: Equality and autonomy in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Michigan Law Review, May 1997. 1517.
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4. Media and Culture
Beyond the system of relationships between the media and democracy, the other 
fundamental group of issues in the focal point of debates in the determination of 
the content of media focuses on the relationship between the media and culture. 
Again, the issue is so complicated that it is not suffi cient to rely only on the solutions 
proposed by lawyers, though they can surely defi ne some of the cornerstones. The 
starting point is the assertion that the media and culture have a complicated and 
controversial relationship. The modern mass media are capable of delivering cultural 
products to a much wider audience than before, thus ensuring their preservation and 
further development. At the same time, because of their unique nature and the logic of 
the market, which has been condemned many times, the “mainstream” media do not 
view the broadcast and introduction of higher cultural products as its responsibility. 
What is more, the media not only channel the content, characteristically aiming at 
mere entertainment, as demanded by the masses, but they also create and form the 
new “cultural” environment. 
Mass media have signifi cantly reformed the means of access to culture and 
infl uenced its general quality. Today, the general level of culture is determined not by 
a narrow elite but by the standards of average citizens. This was the price of becoming 
multitudinous. The next dimension of becoming multitudinous is the development, 
which began two-three decades ago with its emergence, of global media. The 
spreading of multinational media enterprises, the demolition of the Iron Curtain, and 
the global marketing of American cultural products resulted in the fi rst sprouts of 
shared, supranational, global culture. Simultaneously with, and as a response to, this 
tendency, certain initiatives soon emerged for the preservation of individual national 
cultures. According to the most horrifi c scenario, the global media industry in the 
long run will result in the total destruction of national cultures. Perhaps this script 
envisions dangers, because the preservation of national cultures is not only the role 
of the media, and the global media market could even assist in sustaining national 
cultures (for example, with the help of Internet publication of previously hard to 
access content; let us not forget that the Internet, making national cultures available 
with the press of a button and free of charge, is itself the product of the global media 
industry). The new universal culture can actively contribute to a supranational, 
common identity; of course, on what kind of elements this new identity is built is 
important. Namely, the appearance of American “cultural imperialism“42 in certain 
television programmes, movies, and musical pieces, which are characteristically not 
among the products of “high culture.” Regarding their fi nancial means, creators of 
the products of national culture are unable to compete with the makers of products 
for the global market. Therefore, other protectionist measures are necessary. The 
State has important functions in the preservation of national culture. At least thus 
far, nobody was brave enough to openly dispute this. The European approach to the 
42  BRIGGS–BURKE, supra note 30., 248.
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protection of national culture accepts state intervention as a defi nitely valid reason. 
Regarding the manner of intervention, however, a certain level of uncertainty can 
be sensed, and not without reason. To protect national culture, the State would have 
to go into battle with company giants reigning over the media market of the world, 
while at the same time states are bound, on one hand, by international treaties and 
their monitoring bodies, and on the other, regulations of the internal market dictated 
by European integration. It is worthy, however, to return to the cradle or, yet even, the 
conception of European unity. Jean Monnet, one of the fathers of integration, stated 
that if we could start it all over, we should begin with culture.43 The idea, according 
to which Europe is primarily a spiritual and cultural unity, originally counted as 
the intellectual foundation of the entire integration effort. Therefore, based on the 
original intentions, the European integration process should have assisted in the 
preservation of national cultures and, at the same time, defi ned the elements of 
European culture existing according to popular belief and resting on an integrated 
foundation (Robert Schuman’s essay, For Europe, is built on this idea. Even the title 
of one his chapters is telling: Europe “before becoming a military alliance or an 
economic entity, must be a cultural community in the highest sense of the term.”44) 
In practice, this has not happened in the more than half a century that has passed 
since its beginning.  The Audiovisual Media Services Directive, beyond defi ning 
general minimal content requirements, basically upholds the right of Member States 
to control audiovisual content, primarily through certain limitations of the market, 
and tries to protect national and European identity. Union law, for example, allows 
the existence of public service media service providers, although their state fi nancing 
is contrary to the requirements of free market competition. Further, the Directive 
requires that television-programming services must broadcast European works in 
more than fi fty percent of their content. The weak point of the regulation is that it 
tries to protect cultural identity based exclusively on formal criteria (practically, a 
public service broadcaster is what is called that way, and European work is something 
that was created by a company with its head offi ce in a Member State), and it does 
not introduce content regulation. As such, the end result does not achieve the desired 
objective: a great portion of public service broadcasters do not signifi cantly differ 
from commercial ones and practically anybody can produce a European work, not to 
mention that there is no remedy against the actual phenomenon that, for example, an 
European work can follow American patterns and contain no elements of European 
culture at all.  
5. Conclusion
How can the concept of freedom of the press be ultimately defi ned? Would A.J. 
Liebling be right, whose bon mot quoted a number of times states “freedom of the 
43  Quoted by Richard COLLINS: Media and identity in contemporary Europe: consequences of global 
convergence. Exeter, Intellect, 2002. 25.
44  Robert SCHUMAN: Európáért. [For Europe] Pécs, Pannónia Könyvek, 1991.
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press is guaranteed only to those who own one.”45 No, he is not right at all. The right 
to the freedom of the press is a complex right, encumbered with the need to reconcile 
rather diverse interests, and, in the course of exercising this right, its external limits, 
as well as the content thereof and the resulting obligations, should be taken into 
consideration.
The following ideas might also be worth some consideration. Some argue that 
the Internet has fundamentally changed social communication and has overturned 
the traditional and easily identifi able – and able to be regulated – means of public 
communication. Social publicity has moved to the realm of the online world. As 
such, regulation of traditional media and the legal recognition of the positive nature 
of the freedom of the press became pointless, as it makes no sense to regulate media 
that are being marginalised anyway while the free world wide web is blossoming. 
While the Internet obviously contributes to the free movement of ideas and to the 
democratisation of publicity, its technical features (unlimited expansion, anonymity, 
possible emergence of dependence) also contribute to the spread of infringement and 
inequality, and generate further problems.46
The functioning of the online marketplace of ideas is also imperfect. There is close 
competition for the grace of consumers, even on the Internet. In this competition, 
the arguments for an unregulated Internet and the objective to reserve it as an 
“uncorrupted reservoir of democracy” become irrelevant. Actors with more fi nancial 
means have enormous advantages, even in cyberspace.47 The most frequently visited 
websites are owned by corporations, which are also powerful market actors in real 
space.48 These conglomerates and media empires attempt to form the world wide web 
to their likeness; while these attempts may remain fruitless due to the very nature of 
this specifi c medium, they may succeed in limiting the browsing habits of large parts 
of society to the content provided by them, while banishing ideas that do not fi t in. 
However, the disagreement between the proponents of free market and state 
intervention seems to be irreconcilable, and so constant efforts are required to have 
the positive nature of press freedom recognised and accepted. Of course, it is true that 
no change could be a pressing interest for those who have an interest in maintaining 
the status quo, the current situation.49 However, “press freedom cannot be absolute 
without contradicting the ethical basis for its existence”.50 
45  A. J. LIEBLING: The press. New York, Pantheon Books, 1981 (3rd ed.).
46  Perry KELLER: European and International Media Law. Liberal Democracy, Trade and the New 
Media Oxford, Oxford University Press 2011. 21–27.
47  Seth F. KREIMER: „Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First Amendment in 
the Era of the Internet.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2001, 119.
48  Andrew CHIN: „Making the World Wide Web Safe for Democracy” Hastings Communication and 
Entertainment Law Journal 1997, 322–325. és 328–329.; James CURRAN – Jean SEATON: Power without 
Responsibility. (London -- New York: Routledge 62003) 248–250 és 281–282.
49  FREDERICK SCHAUER: The political incidence of the free speech principle. Colorado Law Review, Fall 
1993. 949.
50  JOHN LAWS: The limitations of human rights. Public Law, 1998. 265.
